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Piracy around the Horn of Africa
Joshua Ho
1 Résumé long
2 Depuis 1991 et le départ de Siad Barre, la Somalie vit dans un profond chaos. En 2004, un
gouvernement fédéral de transition a été mis en place avant d’être renversé par l’Union
des tribunaux islamiques deux ans plus tard. Ces derniers ont dû à leur tour battre en
retraite  suite  à  l’arrivée  des  forces  éthiopiennes  qui  ont  réhabilité  les  autorités
précédentes fin 2006. Depuis le départ de ces troupes, le désordre prend de l’ampleur.
3 Dans  ce  contexte,  la  piraterie  explose.  Déjà  présente  dans  les  années  80  puis  en
augmentation  dans  les  années  90,  elle  a  franchi  un  palier  en  2008.  Cette  industrie
intéresse non plus seulement les jeunes désœuvrés mais aussi les seigneurs de guerre, des
chefs de clans et des fonctionnaires corrompus. Le lien avec les milices islamistes est plus
difficile à établir avec certitude. 
4 Pour mener à bien leurs opérations, les pirates sont lourdement armés, entre autres de
lance-roquettes et d’AK-47. Ils opèrent à bord de vedettes rapides et depuis des bateaux-
mères mouillants au large des côtes. Depuis quelques mois, les pirates se montrent de
plus en plus ambitieux dans le choix de leurs cibles, comme l’illustrent les attaques contre
le Faina, avec à son bord des chars, et contre le superpétrolier Sirius Star.
5 Ce regain de la piraterie pèse sur les armateurs. En plus du coût des assurances qui peut
tripler chez certaines sociétés, le détour par le cap de Bonne espérance – pour éviter la
zone à risque – nécessite davantage de carburant et de jours en mer. Aujourd’hui, les
gestionnaires du canal de Suez s’inquiètent de cette source de revenues qui lui échappe
en ne payant pas les péages.
6 Pour lutter en mer contre les pirates, les Etats-Unis ont pris l’initiative de mettre en place
la Task Force 151. Cette coalition complète les opérations de l’OTAN dédiées à l’escorte des
navires  du  programme  alimentaire  mondial.  L’Europe,  directement  touchée  par  la
piraterie, est également présente à travers l’opération Atalanta depuis décembre 2008. En
parallèle, de nombreux navires patrouillent dans les eaux somaliennes sous leur propre
pavillon.
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7 Ces  manœuvres  aussi  préventives  que  répressives  sont  juridiquement  encadrées  par
quatre résolutions adoptées aux Nations unies en 2008. Ces dispositions offrent plus de
flexibilité  avec le  droit de la  mer et  invitent  à  la coopération régionale.  En sus,  des
réunions se sont tenues au Caire, à Nairobi ainsi qu’à Djibouti début 2009. Cette dernière
conférence a donné lieu à l’adoption d’un code de conduite régional. 
8 Dans le futur, des mesures devront être prises pour augmenter le nombre de navires sur
place et surtout les modes de communication. Par ailleurs, il faudra s’attacher à mener
davantage d’enquêtes à terre ainsi  qu’à s’assurer des poursuites judiciaires,  voire des
emprisonnements. De plus, les marins sont eux aussi invités à prendre plus de mesures à
bord de leurs navires. Surtout, le comportement des pétroliers et pêcheurs au large doit
être irréprochable pour calmer les ardeurs des Somaliens.
9 Le contexte national reste déterminant et exige une solution rapide. Aussi les prochains
efforts du nouveau président somalien devront-ils être suivis avec grande attention
 
Background
10 Somalia has been without an operational  government since 1991 when the country’s
leader and a U.S. ally, Muhammad Siad Barre, was overthrown. Warlords have held sway
in the urban centres for over a decade despite no fewer than 14 initiatives to create a
central government. The country is poor and children starve and people kill one another
in the streets of Mogadishu. Large numbers of the populace have turned to piracy.
11 Somalia’s current Transitional Federal Government (TFG), established in 2004 and backed
by the United Nations, the United States, and the regional Intergovernmental Authority
on Development, has limited capacity to enforce rule of law throughout the country. It
was based originally in Nairobi,  Kenya but in mid-2005 moved to the Somali town of
Baidoa, not to Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, which has been dominated by Islamists. 
12 When the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) came to power in mid-2006, piracy in Somalia
dropped  to  zero.  This  is  because  the  UIC  announced  that  they  would  punish  those
engaged in piracy according to Sharia law. For, example, when pirates struck the UAE
cargo ship MV Veesham I, the UIC in response set to sea in small boats, recaptured the
vessel and rescued the crew after a gun battle with the pirates. However, in December
2006, Ethiopian troops expelled the Islamist forces from Mogadishu and re-established
the TFG.
13 The  Somali  TFG government  continues  to  battle  Islamic  and other  militias  with  the
fighting concentrated in the capital, Mogadishu. Ethiopian forces supported the TFG prior
to their withdrawal from Somalia on 13 January 20091 as required under a recent cease-
fire deal2 and in accordance with the Djibouti Agreement.3
14 After the withdrawal of Ethiopian troops, instability continued. The weak transitional
government, the anti-Islamist warlords, the anti-government clan militias and Islamic
groups, some of whom have links to Al-Qaeda elements, notably the Al Shabab, which has
been declared a terrorist organisation by the U.S. in March 2008 and which is behind
terrorist attacks on Ethiopia and U.S. interests in the region, struggled for power. To
complicate matters, the TFG has no control over Puntland, which declared itself a semi-
autonomous state in 1998 and is currently the base of piracy. Somaliland, which declared
independence in 1991 after the overthrow of the Siad Barre regime, is also not part of the
TFG.
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 Causes of Piracy
15 Piracy around Somalia started in the 1980s but accelerated after the fall of the Somalian
government in the early 1990s. Originally the pirates claimed they were aiming to stop
the rampant illegal fishing and dumping of toxic waste that continues to this day off the
Somali  coast.4 After  the  fall  of  the  Somali  government,  piracy  started  to  flourish
especially  when  shipping  companies  started  paying  ransoms,  initially  in  the  tens  of
thousands of dollars range, rising to hundreds of thousands, and which now amount to
millions. The pirates are young Somalis from poor communities in mainly the Puntland
region so far. The majority of attacks have occurred off the Puntland region of Somalia,
near the town of Eyl and in the Mudug region.
16 The Gulf of Aden is a transit point for the 20,000 ships a year that use the Suez Canal.5
According to the International  Maritime Bureau 2008 Annual Report,6 more than 111
ships have been attacked in 2008 as compared to 44 in 2007. 92 of the attacks were in the
Gulf of Aden with 19 attacks off Somalia. There were 42 successful hijacks in 2008 as
compared to 13 in 2007. As of 31 December 2008, there were 13 vessels with 242 crew
members being held hostage for ransom on the East Coast of Somalia. Ransom demanded
ranges from US$500,000 to US$2,000,000 and have escalated towards the end of 2008.
Most captured ships are not released for less than US$10,000. So far ransoms that have
been  accrued  have  amounted  to  between  US$18  million  to  US$30  million  in  2008,
according  to  a  report  by  Chatham House  in  October.7 Kenya’s foreign  minister  has,
however, put a higher amount to the ransoms paid and claims that more than US$150
million in ransoms have been paid in 2008.8 The ransoms are usually negotiated directly
between the ship owner and the pirates, but sometimes a middle man is used.
17 As the pirates become more successful and more profitable, it attracted the attention of
Somali clan warlords. Apparently, the pirates are able to operate across clan lines for
mutual benefit and have opened new, lucrative, multi-clan franchises. Officials have been
reported to be complicit as well and as such it may not be the case that the authorities in
Puntland want to stop the piracy. There are reports of nefarious relationships between
fishing  companies,  private  security  contractors  and  Somali  government  officials.
Although the jails are full of criminals, there seems to be a lack of will to prosecute, or the
inability to fully house all the criminals in their jails. Many people are now flocking to
these pirate havens to be recruited and to participate in piracy which may overwhelm the
ability of the local jurisdiction to cope and respond.9
18 Islamists have also been reported to help with bases from which the pirates operate and
arms  are  reportedly  being  smuggled  from Eritrea.10 However,  it  is  unlikely  that  the
terrorist group Al-Shabab is involved as they have said that ships belonging to Muslim
countries should not be seized after pirates hijacked the Saudi supertanker, the Sirius Star
.  Islamist  leaders have also stressed that  piracy is  a  capital  offence under Islam and
condemned the surge in piracy in Somalia’s waters.11
 
Modus Operandi of Pirates
19 The pirates are armed with RPG,  AK-47 assault  rifles,  and larger calibre anti-aircraft
machine guns and anti-tank missiles.The attacks are launched from small speed boats, or
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20-foot fibreglass skiffs with high freeboards and one or two 85-150 HP outboard engines
which enable them to achieve speeds of up to 23 knots. As the endurance of the skiffs is
limited,  they  are  launched  from  mother  ships  that  resemble  the  fishing  trawlers
prevalent in the region, which they can blend in with. These mother ships have greater
endurance and can stay out at sea for a longer period of time. The mother ships move
around in the seas of the region looking for targets of opportunity and when a merchant
ship comes into view, the skiffs attack as a pack. It has been said that there are at least
two mother ships in operation, with two skiffs in tow each. However, the frequency of
pirate attacks may suggest a greater number of mother ships in operation.12
20 Previously only fishing vessels and smaller cargo ships were hijacked, but now targets
include chemical tankers, fishing vessels, small cargo ships, bulk carriers, luxury yachts,
VLCCs and recently, even a container vessel, 13which has hitherto been thought to be safe
from pirate attack due to the high speeds that it could attain. It would appear then that
all ships are potential targets for piracy in the Gulf of Aden. 
21 Two of the more high profile targets have included a Ukrainian vessel loaded with heavy
weapons and a Saudi owned VLCC. The MV Faina, or “crown” in Russian, was a Ukrainian
vessel loaded with rifles, heavy weapons and 33 Soviet made T-72 tanks that the pirates
captured on 25 September 2008. The ship was initially thought to have been heading for
Sudan or some other African country, possibly Kenya. The MV Faina was n surrounded by
three warships from the Combined Task Force 150 during its hijack to prevent the ship’s
deadly cargo from ending up in the hands of  Somalia’s  Islamic insurgents and other
terrorists.14 The initial ransom demand was for US$35 million15 but it was finally released
for a reported sum of US$3.2 million.16 The second high profile target was the Saudi
owned MV Sirius Star, a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) of 318,000 dead weight tonnes,
and  330  metre  length  that  was  hijacked  on  the  15  November  2008  at  a  distance  of
450 nautical miles southeast of Mombassa, Kenya. The ship carried 25 crew members, and
2 million barrels of oil worth US$100 million.17 The ship was anchored off Haradheere and
US$25 million in ransom was demanded initially. . However, the ship was released on the
9 January 2009 after a much reduced ransom payment of US$3 million was paid.18 
 
Consequences of Piracy
22 One of the consequences of piracy is the increase in insurance rates for the shipping
industry and the need to purchase additional insurance to cover the risk associated with
transiting a piracy prone region. For example, insurance companies now offer “kidnap for
ransom” policies to ships that move through the Suez Canal. One insurance company, the
U.K. based Hiscox, prices the policy at US$15,000 per trip through the Gulf of Aden and it
is reported that business is humming.19 Also, because of the danger posed to shipping
transiting  the  Gulf  of  Aden,  insurance  premiums  have  risen  tenfold.  For  example,
insurance companies have increased premiums for sending a cargo shipment through the
Gulf of Aden to about US$9,000 from US$900 a year ago.20
23 As ships try to circumvent the Gulf of Aden by travelling south around the Cape of Good
Hope, there is an increase in travel time with its attendant costs. This detour will add
4,000 km, or 12 to 15 days, to a tanker’s trip, at a cost of between US$20,000 to US$30,000
a day.21 A.P. Moeller-Maersk A/S, one of the world’s largest ocean-shipping lines, and
other companies have said they will re-route some of their vessels around the southern
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tip of Africa instead of traversing the gulf, despite the added distance, time, and fuel
costs. This is because tankers are considered more vulnerable with their low hulls and
slower speeds.22 Taiwan shipping company, TMT, meanwhile has also said that it would be
re-routing 20 oil tankers via the Cape of Good Hope. TMT’s fleet is regularly employed to
ferry crude oil supplies to consumers in Europe and the United States.23 Following the
hijack of the MV Sirius Star, Odfjell SE, a major Norwegian shipping group, announced on
18 November that it has ordered its tankers, numbering about 90, to sail around Africa
rather than to use the Suez Canal.24 Already, the number of ships transiting the Suez
Canal in January has fallen by 22% compared to the same month in 2008 and represents
the lowest level passing through the waterway in five years.25To be sure, the reduction in
the number of ships transiting the Suez Canal is not solely the consequence of rampant
piracy off the coast of Somalia but also due to the aggressive capacity cutting measures
taken by ocean carriers to reverse losses as carriers will save on canal fees by sailing
around the Cape of Good Hope.
 
Naval Forces on Scene
24 The force that has been on scene the longest is Combined Task Force 150 (CTF 150). CTF
150 is a U.S. led multinational coalition naval task force with logistics facilities in Djibouti
established to monitor, inspect, board, and stop suspect shipping to pursue the War on
Terrorism in the Horn of Africa (HOA) region. However, CTF 150 does not have an anti-
piracy mandate. Countries presently contributing to CTF 150 include Canada, Denmark,
France, Germany, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States. Other nations who
have participated include Australia,  Italy,  Netherlands,  New Zealand,  Portugal,  Spain,
Turkey and Japan, which is providing logistics support to the effort.26 Although anti-
piracy operations are not within the mandate of CTF 150, some of its ships have been
involved in anti-piracy operations on a case-by-case basis through individual national
commitment  rather  than  as  part  of  a  Task  Force.  The  ships  have  participated,  for
example,  since  2006  in  the  escort  of  ships  used  for  the  United  Nations  World  Food
Programme, transporting food from Mombassa, Kenya to Mogadishu.27 CTF 150, under the
mandate of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816 in June 2008, established
a Maritime Security Patrol  Area (MSPA) on the 22 August 2008,  which is  a maritime
corridor through the Gulf of Aden aimed at deterring attack and the hijacking of ships
seeking safe passage through the zone.28 To address the limitations of CTF 150, a new
Combined Task Force 151 was established on the 8 January 2009 to provide a U.S.-led
command  structure  for  ships  in  CTF  150  that  are  allowed  to  conduct  anti-piracy
operations, and to also allow for the inclusion of nations willing to participate in U.S. led
anti-piracy operations, but who do not want to be involved in the anti-terrorism tasks of
CTF 150.29 Singapore will be sending a Landing Ship Tank equipped with two helicopters
and two hundred personnel for a three-month tour of duty with CTF 151.30 South Korea
and Japan will also be sending ships to be part of CTF 151.31
25 On 24 October 2008, NATO deployed five warships from the Standing NATO Maritime
Group 2 (SNMG2) to conduct anti-piracy duties off the coast of Somalia. The five warships
were from Italy, Greece, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and Germany. Under the codename
of Allied Provider, the five vessels provided close protection for World Food Programme
(WFP) vessels and patrolled routes most susceptible to criminal acts against merchant
vessels.32 Allied Provider was a temporary operation that was requested by the Secretary-
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General of the United Nations, Ban Ki-Moon, on 25 September 2008 and was replaced by
the EU (European Union) mission Atlanta in December 2008.33
26 The EU’s operation was limited to a period of one year, and will to protect vessels from
pirate attacks off the coast of Somalia.34 The operation was codenamed Atlanta and the
ships are based in Djibouti  and Kenya.  The EU naval force will  take over the role of
escorting United Nations World Food Programme vessels  and also protect  vulnerable
vessels cruising off the Somali coast. The naval task force includes six warships and three
surveillance planes from France, Spain and Greece. To avoid duplication of the tasks done
by CTF 150 and allay U.S. concerns that the EU deployment will weaken EU commitment
to CTF 150, the EU force will take over the patrols of the MSPA and thereby free up assets
from CTF 150.35 Norway has indicated through the UN Security Council that it would be
open to requests for technical assistance to strengthen national capacity in the region to
combat piracy,  and was ready to contribute to naval operations in the area in 2009.
Sweden, pending parliamentary decision, had also announced its intention to contribute
a navy unit to the EU led operation Atlanta, primarily in order to protect and escort WFP
vessels.36
27 Besides the ships operating under EU auspices, CTF 150, CTF 151, or NATO, there have
been ships deployed to the Gulf of Aden on independent national missions primarily to
protect national shipping plying the routes and in response to previous attacks on their
ships. Countries that have despatched naval ships to the region include Russia,37 India,38
China39 and Malaysia.40
28 Japan sent a team of Coast Guard officials to visit Yemen and Oman in mid-December 08
to  learn  more  about  attacks  in  the  Gulf  of  Aden,  study  security  measures  aimed at
stopping them, and look at ways to support anti-piracy efforts. The Japanese Ship Owner’s
Association says that there were ten raids on Japanese-affiliated vessels in 2008.41 Japan
has also decided to dispatch destroyers to the Gulf of Aden for the anti-piracy mission.42
 
International Measures Adopted
29 There have been several actions taken so far through the adoption of United Nations
Security Council Resolutions to address the problem of piracy around the Horn of Africa.
Such actions intensified in 2008, especially in response to the increasing ransom demands
which have escalated dramatically in dollar terms during the year.
30 The landmark resolution was the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816 (2008)
adopted unanimously on 2 June 08 that lasted for 6 months. The Resolution authorised
countries to enter Somali territorial waters and use all necessary means to identify, deter,
prevent, and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea in a manner consistent with
the provision of international law. Hence, the international force could board, search and
seize suspect vessels and arrest the perpetrators in the territorial  waters of  Somalia.
However,  the  Resolution  required  that  the  forces  cooperate  with  Somalia’s  interim
government and notify the UN Secretary General when proposing to conduct anti-piracy
operations  in  Somalia’s  TTW.  Somalia’s  interim  government  has  given  approval  for
foreign forces to operate in Somalia’s territorial waters and has consented to UNSCR 1816.
31 Recognising that while physical enforcement action at sea is important, actions to curb
financial flows of pirates and deal with possible organised criminal elements have to be
addressed as well. As such, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1844
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(2008)  on  20  November  2008.  The  Resolution  imposed  sanctions  on  pirates,  arms
smugglers, and perpetrators of instability and people who prevent the distribution of
humanitarian assistance to Somalia which included entities as well as individuals. The
resolution directs  that  member  States  freeze  the  funds  and financial  assets  of  those
suspected of such acts and deny them entry and transit rights. An arms embargo was to
be enforced and the provision of military technical assistance and military training was
to be banned. In addition, member States were to ensure that their own nationals did not
collaborate with the people and entities identified to be targets of the sanction.43
32 As the UNSC Resolution 1816 only had a six month validity period and expired on the 1
December 2008, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1846 (2008) on 2 December
2008 which would last  for  one year.  The resolution was in essence a renewal  of  the
mandate given in UNSC Resolution 1816 (2008). Resolution 1846 (2008) allows States and
regional  organisations  cooperating  with  the  Somali  Transitional  Federal  Government
(TFG) to enter Somalia’s territorial waters and use all necessary means, such as deploying
naval vessels and military aircraft, as well as seizing and disposing of boats, vessels, arms
and related equipment used for piracy, to fight piracy and armed robbery at sea off the
Somali coast, in accordance with relevant international law.44
33 The UN Security Council also recognised that to curb the piracy problem, there needs to
be  concerted  action  on  land  as  well,  which  resulted  in  the  adoption  of  the  UNSC
Resolution 1851 (2008) on 16 December 2008 that would last for one year. The resolution
allows  States  and regional  organisations  cooperating  in  the  fight  against  piracy  and
armed robbery  at  sea  off  the  coast  of  Somalia  to  undertake  all  necessary  measures
appropriate in Somalia,  to interdict those using Somali  territory to plan, facilitate or
undertake such acts. The Council also invited entities to conclude special agreements or
arrangements with countries willing to take custody of pirates in order to embark law
enforcement officials, known as “shipriders”, from the latter countries to facilitate the
investigation and prosecution of persons detained as a result of operations conducted
under the resolution.  The entities were also encouraged to establish an international
cooperation mechanism to act as a common point of contact among them on all aspects of
the anti-piracy operations.45
34 As a result of the UNSC Resolution 1851 (2008), a UN Contact Group has been formed that
aims  to  provide  the  international  community  with  the  necessary  mechanisms  for
coordination and cooperation to combat piracy off the coast of Somalia, in accordance
with international law.46 The Contact Group had its inaugural meeting in New York on 14
January 2009 and it participation included more than 20 countries,  together with the
European Union, NATO, and the African Union. There were four functional groups under
the Contact Group. The first group was led by the United Kingdom and was responsible
for the Coordination of naval operations and information sharing. The second group was
led by Denmark & the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime which would address the
judicial  aspects  of  piracy.  The  third  group  was  led  by  the United  States  and  was
responsible for strengthening industry awareness and capabilities. The last and fourth
group was led by Egypt and was responsible for strategic communications and public
information. The Contact Group also called for the setting up of an East African counter-
piracy coordination centre (CPCC). The Contact Group would report its findings to the UN
Security Council.
35 Besides international responses, there has also been an attempt at creating a regional
response to the situation. On 20 November 2008, the Red Sea coastal states in the Arab
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league  had a  consultative  meeting  in  Cairo,  Egypt  to  coordinate  a  common strategy
against piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. The meeting was held
under the joint presidency of Yemen and Egypt.47 The countries that attended included
Saudi  Arabia,  Yemen,  Sudan,  Jordan,  Djibouti,  and  the  Somalia  Transitional  Federal
Government. The communiqué mentioned that Arab nations around the Red Sea were
principally  responsible  for  security  there  and any arrangement  or  operation therein
required  prior  consultation  with  those  States.  The  communiqué  also  recommended
establishing  joint  mechanisms,  joint  training  for  coast  guard  forces,  and  welcomed
international and regional support as well as the promotion of coordination, consultation
and exchange of information through the establishment of a regional maritime centre in
Yemen.
36 An International Conference on Piracy around Somalia was also held in Nairobi, Kenya on
11 December 2008 that was backed by the United Nations and attended by 145 delegates
from 45 countries, including ministers and ambassadors.48 The conference concluded that
support must be given to Somalia to secure its coastal waters for the recovery of the
Somali fishing community and industry. This could be done through the establishment of
an effective police and coastguard to provide adequate law enforcement capacity to deal
with  piracy,  human  trafficking,  illegal  fishing  and  dumping  of  toxic  waste.  The
conference  also  recommended  the  establishment  of  a  task  force  comprising
representation from the UN, the international community and Somalia, to identify and
investigate the issues at the local community level including local complaints with regard
to economic and security concerns, the illegal exploitation of Somali maritime resources,
human and arms trafficking and toxic waste dumping. The joint communiqué issued at
the end of the two day meeting admitted that piracy cannot be effectively tackled in
Somalia  without  the  return  of  peace,  stability  and  a  functioning  government.  The
communiqué also highlighted the importance of strengthening the capacity of the Somali
national as well as regional authorities in combating the piracy menace, both to interdict
pirates at sea, and to take effective legal action against pirates once returned to shore. To
that end an amount of US$1.3 million was provided to boost the criminal justice systems
of  Kenya,  Djibouti,  Yemen  and  Tanzania.  Providing  a  broader  agreement  between
coalition countries and coastal nations such as Kenya, Tanzania, Djibouti and Yemen was
one of the main proposals on the agenda of the conference. As a result, Yemen will be
establishing a regional centre for exchanging information on piracy and for mobilising
material support to coordinate regional and international anti-piracy efforts.49
37 On 29 January 2009, 21 governments of the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden
adopted the Djibouti Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy and Armed
Robbery  against  ships  in  the  Western  Indian  Ocean  and  the  Gulf  of  Aden  after  a
conference  organised  under  the  auspices  of  the  International  Maritime  Organisation
(IMO).50 Although the Code of Conduct ismodelled on the ReCAAP Agreement51, it covers
more matters, but unlike ReCAAP, it is not a formal agreement. The purpose of the Code
of Conduct is to repress piracy and armed robbery against ships by information sharing,
with national focal points, interdicting ships suspected of engaging in piracy, ensuring
apprehension and prosecution of pirates and adopting uniform criteria for the reporting
of incidents. It also calls for multiple states with legitimate interests to liaise, coordinate
and facilitate rescue, interdiction, investigation and prosecution. The Code also provides
for “Ship Riders” or “Embarked Officers” to facilitate arrests in each others maritime
zones. Each participant will review its national legislation to ensure there are adequate
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measures in place to criminalise piracy and armed robbery against ships, and adequate
guidelines for the exercise of jurisdiction, conduct of investigation and the prosecution of
alleged offenders. There are also provisions on the Exercise of Jurisdiction. For example,
in the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), it declares that the seizing State may waive its
primary right to exercise jurisdiction and authorise any other Participant to exercise
jurisdiction.  In  the  Territorial  Sea,  it  states  that  the  offenders  are  subject  to  the
jurisdiction of the coastal State, unless otherwise arranged by the affected Participants.
The Code also retains limits to protect the flag States and coastal States by providing that
nothing in the Code is intended to entitle a participant to undertake in the territory of
another Participant the exercise of jurisdiction and performance of functions which are
exclusively reserved for the authorities of that other Participant by its national law. Also,
nothing  in  the  Code  is  intended  to  affect  in  any  way  the  rule  of  international  law
pertaining  to  the  competence  of  State  to  exercise  investigative  and  enforcement
jurisdiction on board ships not flying their flag.
 
Possible Future Actions
38 Although many resolutions have been adopted and conferences held to address the issue
of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Aden, the immediate action that needs to be
done is to get more countries to contribute ships as there only 19 in the area currently.
The current number of ships is not sufficient to cover the large area of operations and it
is estimated that up to 68 ships are required to adequately cover the area. The coastline of
Somalia is 3,900 km long which affords the pirates many launching points to attack ships
at sea.  The additional  ships will  be required to protect the ships and tankers,  locate
mother ships or boats and apprehend the culprits.  Besides urging more countries to
dispatch ships to the region,  greater effort  must  be made to integrate those already
present on scene into an operation that is more coordinated in order to make better use
of scarce resources and make the anti-piracy effort more effective. It is not clear how the
different ships from the EU, CTF 151 and the independent ships from India, Russia, China
and Malaysia communicate with each other. A unique opportunity is presenting itself for
the forces present to institute some form of common communications protocol to share
information and it would be a pity not to work at greater collaboration between the
different forces present.
39 Secondly, some action on the ground is needed to identify the hide-outs in Somalia and to
arrest and prosecute the persons operating in the hide-outs. However, no international
force is forthcoming due to previous failed UN peacekeeping operations undertaken in
the country. A possible alternative is to learn from a chapter in history.In the 16th and 17
th centuries,  monarchs  that  were  frustrated  by  Spain’s  dominance  of  the  Caribbean
commissioned privateers to harass the Spanish fleet. In similar vein, the international
community may consider incentivising the local community to conduct policing action
against the pirates. Besides actions in Somalia itself, many of the attacks also appear to
originate from the Yemeni coast and from the Yemeni island of Suqutra (Socotra). It may
be necessary to  adopt  new United Nations  Security  Council  Resolutions  allowing the
international  forces  present  to  take  similar  action in  Yemeni  waters  as  is  currently
granted to them in Somali waters. 
40 Thirdly, in order to prosecute pirates overseas, there must be legal regimes enacted to
enable the foreign forces to do so. Although the UNSC Resolutions 1846 and 1851 allows
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foreign forces to operate in the EEZ and territorial waters off Somalia, they will still need
the consent of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia to do so. In addition, if
pirates are captured, the nation that captured the pirates must have enacted national
legislation to allow for the prosecution of the pirates apprehended, on the high seas or
the EEZ in accordance with UNCLOS Article 101. In particular, bilateral agreements will
need to be concluded with regional countries for prosecution if the pirates are not to be
brought back home. For example, both the United States and the United Kingdom have
bilateral agreements to transfer apprehended pirates to Kenya for prosecution. However,
it this appears to be on a case-by-case basis and there may be a need for a more broad
based agreement with other countries as well. Examination of the use of other kinds of
international legislation to enable prosecution, such as the 1988 SUA Convention, should
also be considered.
41 Fourthly, the shipping industry will need to take greater security measures onboard the
ships.  There  have  been examples  of  ships  that  have  repelled  pirate  attacks  through
aggressive manoeuvring and the use of non-lethal weapons like the Long Range Accoustic
Device (LRAD). The use of guards onboard could also be considered. However, shipowners
will  have to  discuss  with their  P&I  clubs  on whether  having guards  onboard,  either
private security or military, will invalidate their cover as there is a question of whether
the shipowner is acting as a ‘prudent uninsured’ in doing so. This is because although war
risk insurers cover crew members killed or injured in pirate incidents, guards are not
considered part of the crew of the ship. There is a perception that with guards onboard,
the threat escalates, with a higher likelihood of a claim. The counter argument is that the
shipowners are acting prudently due to the heightened risk in the Gulf of Aden.52 There is
also a case to be made for insurers to incentivise shipowners to install security devices
onboard by offering a discount on insurance premiums for ships that have adequate
security equipment installed, much in the same way that deductibles increase with more
safety devices installed in a car. 
42 Fifthly, some of the grievances expressed by the Somalis as reasons for piracy should be
addressed. In particular, many of the pirates used to be fishermen who worked in the sea
daily until foreign vessels started fishing illegally along the Somali coast, destroying their
nets and firing upon them. There were even accusations of the dumping of toxic waste. To
address some of  these grievances,  there should be an international  response to curb
illegal fishing is Somali waters and some of the naval forces present could be used to
police illegal fishing as well. 
43 However, it must be recognised that the root cause of piracy and armed robbery in and
around  Somalia  is  due  to  extreme  poverty  and  the  breakdown  of  law  and  order.
Therefore,  in  the  longer  term,  there  is  a  need  to  stabilise  and  resolve  the  political
situation in  Somalia  and in  particular  to  negotiate a  power  sharing  deal  in  Somalia
between anti-Islamist  warlords,  the  Islamic  courts,  and the weak transitional  federal
government. The Djibouti Agreement that was signed on 18 August 2008 between the
Transitional  Federal  Government and the opposition Alliance for the Re-liberation of
Somalia  (ARS)  to  promote  peace  and  stability  in  Somalia  was  intended  to  set  the
framework for a political settlement in the country.53 The Djibouti Agreement had a four-
point action plan: the cessation of all acts of armed confrontation between the parties;
the UN to deploy an international stabilisation force from countries that are friends of
Somalia excluding neighbouring countries; the undertaking of all necessary measures to
ensure unhindered humanitarian access and assistance to affected populations; and the
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establishment of a Joint Security Committee to follow up on the implementation of the
security arrangements.54 However, the main limitation to the Djibouti Agreement is that
the ARS does not represent all the opposition groups in Somalia that are involved in the
fighting. For example, Al Shabab is not part of the ARS.55 Al Shabab has vowed to take
over most parts of Somalia and has been largely successful in recapturing Mogadishu
after the departure of Ethiopian troops. That the ARS does not represent all the parties in
Somalia  also  highlights  the  urgency  of  sending  in  a  UN  sanctioned  international
stabilisation force  to  uphold law and order  and boost  the weak African Union force
present.
44 Recently, the Somali President Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, a moderate Islamist, said that he
would impose Islamic law, or Sharia law, in Somalia but clarified that he would not agree
to a strict interpretation of the law.56 He agreed to the implementation of Sharia law in
order to halt fighting between Somali forces and the Islamic insurgents and has said that
once a solid political solution to the conflict was found, he would ask the African Union
contingent  to  leave.  Already,  more than 40,000 Somalis  have returned to  abandoned
neighbourhoods in Mogadishu. The pragmatism shown by the Somali President seems to
be the best hope yet for a new round of peace if he could broker an agreement between
the  Islamic  insurgents  and  both  the  Puntland and Somaliland  governments.  If  he  is
successful,  there may not be a need to deploy an international peacekeeping force in
Somalia.
 
Conclusion
45 The piracy and armed robbery that is occurring off the coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of
Aden  presents  a  special  case  to  the  international  community  because  of  the  total
breakdown of  law and order within Somalia and the lack of  capacity to secure their
waters unlike piracy in other regions, like the Malacca Straits, for example. The special
nature of the situation in Somalia and the Gulf of Aden has resulted in the adoption of
unprecedented measures by the UN Security Council, such as authorisations for measures
in the territorial sea and in Somalia itself. However, the Resolutions contain provisions
designed to ensure the measures do not establish a precedent for other regions or change
the  fundamental  principles  on  jurisdiction  over  ships.  For  example,  fundamental
principles that have not changed include the need for the consent of the flag state to
board a ship outside of the territorial sea unless an incident of piracy is taking place, and
the need for consent of the coastal State when exercising jurisdiction in its territorial
waters.
46 Despite the actions taken to date, it would still be difficult to prosecute and convict the
suspected “pirates” in many cases,  especially for attacks within the territorial  sea of
Somalia. The 1988 SUA Convention could be used as a basis for jurisdiction, extradition,
and  prosecution.  States  in  every  region  should  ratify  and  implement  all  relevant
conventions including the 1982 UNCLOS and the 1988 SUA Convention. In addition, there
is an urgent need for common legislation on maritime offences,  including piracy and
armed robbery against ships as well as to update domestic legislation to make piracy an
offence in the penal code.
47 In the longer term, there is a need to facilitate a political settlement to restore law and
order and governance in Somalia. In that regard, the Djibouti Agreement appears to offer
the best chance for a resolution. However, to back up the Agreement, the international
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community would need to allocate troops to an UN-backed stabilisation force that will
allow the eventual government formed to restore some semblance of law and order in the
poverty ravaged country. The current effort of the Somali President to incorporate the
interests  of  the  Islamic  insurgents  and  the  interest  of  the  Transitional  Federal
Government and the ARS should also be supported. If he succeeds in establishing broad
based support for his initiatives, there may not be a need for external intervention in
Somalia and piracy itself may also return to more normal levels. 
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RÉSUMÉS
La piraterie au large de la Corne de l’Afrique a augmenté à un degré tel que la communauté
internationale a décidé d’agir de concert pour sécuriser cette voie maritime. Néanmoins, si les
efforts  entrepris  sont  principalement  ceux  de  la  communauté  internationale,  les  démarches
régionales ne sont qu’à leur commencement. Dans le court terme, davantage d’initiatives devront
être prises au niveau opérationnel, comme l’envoi de bateaux supplémentaires et la coordination
des actions menées. Dans le plus long terme, il faudra s’attaquer aux racines de la piraterie et aux
difficultés auxquelles doivent faire face les Somaliens. Il s’agit en particulier de restaurer l’état de
droit  en supportant les  chefs  de file  modérés dans leur tentative de créer un gouvernement
représentatif. 
Piracy  around  the  Horn  of  Africa  has  risen  to  a  level  serious  enough  for  the  international
community to take concerted action to secure an international sea lane. However, the efforts so
far have been initiated mainly by the international community while regional efforts are only
just beginning. In the short term, more action will have to be taken at the operational level like
dispatching more ships and integrating the operations of ships already deployed to the area. In
the longer term, the root causes of piracy and the grievances of the Somali people have to be
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addressed.  In  particular,  there  is  a  need to  restore  law and order  in  Somalia  by  supporting
moderate leaders in their attempts to create a representative government.
INDEX
Mots-clés : Golfe d’Aden, Corne de l’Afrique, Somalie, UN Contact Group, Résolution 1851 (2008)
des Nations unies.
Keywords : Gulf of Aden, Horn of Africa, piracy, Somalia, UN Contact Group, UNSC Resolution
1851 (2008).
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